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Abstract 
This essay examines the mobile wireless services industry Canada.   The industry 
is on the precipice of what could be a major change in the dynamics of competition.  
Industry Canada recently facilitated the market entry of new service providers in order to 
increase competition for the benefit of consumers.  This has the potential to affect the 
success and future growth prospects of the industry’s leading three companies Rogers 
Communications Inc., Bell Canada Enterprises and Telus Corporation.   
The paper provides an overview of the industry’s structure, sources of growth, 
and key challenges.   Performance of the leading companies is compared over the past 
five years. Conclusions are drawn about which company may be best positioned to gain 
increased market penetration and higher average revenues per user.  The paper also 
highlights sources of advantage that incumbent firms can leverage to maintain their 
market share in the face of increasing competition and technological change.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Wireless phones are among the fastest growing consumer products in history 
(Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association, 2009).  The worldwide mobile 
communications industry acquired as many users in 20 years as the fixed line 
telecommunications industry reached in 120 years (Gruber, 2005).  In Canada, wireless 
coverage is now available to 98% of Canadians and two thirds of households have access 
to a wireless phone (Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association, 2009).    
This essay examines the Canadian mobile wireless services industry.  Mobile 
wireless services are provided by three main carriers: Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE), 
Telus Corporation and Rogers Communications Inc.  These companies sell handsets 
(cellular phones and smartphones) and voice and data services to over 21 million 
Canadians.   
Canada’s industry is considered among the most profitable in the world.  It is 
characterized by strong growth in subscriber numbers, consistent increases in revenue 
and competitive marketing and branding.  A key development for the industry occurred in 
2007 when Industry Canada concluded that it was in the best interest of consumers to 
encourage new competition in the marketplace (Industry Canada, 2007).  As a result, the 
government facilitated the process of entry for new companies.  The government reserved 
a certain portion of wireless spectrum (an essential resource for offering wireless 
services) for new carriers during the 2008 spectrum auctions and enacted several 
regulations to ease their market entry. With a number of new operators expected to enter 
the market in late 2009 or 2010, the incumbent players’ healthy margins and strong 
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growth prospects may be challenged. However, the big three incumbents, whose 
combined market share is 95%, have already taken measures to prepare themselves for 
increased competition.    
This industry analysis will provide information on the current status of the major 
players in the industry, examine how they have sought to differentiate themselves, and 
determine the sources of advantage that they can draw upon to sustain their market share 
in an increasingly competitive environment.  This paper will also explore issues affecting 
growth prospects and assess which companies may be in the best position to gain 
increased market penetration and higher revenues average per user.   
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2. Industry Overview 
 
2.1 Industry Definition   
This paper analyzes the mobile wireless services industry in Canada.  Mobile 
wireless carriers or operators are companies that enable business and consumers to use 
their cellular phones (referred to as handsets).   Operators provide subscribers access to a 
network to make voice calls, so it is often said that operators sell airtime.  Additionally, 
operators supply data services that support mobile access to the internet, email, digital 
picture and video transmission, mobile video, music downloading, video calling and two-
way short messaging service (SMS).  These advanced data services are an increasingly 
important source of revenue for the industry.  Carriers also sell handsets to their 
subscribers, including smartphones, which are cellular phones that often have PC-like 
functions and additional features such as an MP3 player or a camera. 
Technically, mobile telecommunications is a subset of wireless communications 
which refers to communication services that allow the users to move around without 
losing their connection (Kazam Technologies Inc., 2007).  However, the terms wireless 
and mobile are often used interchangeably to describe the telecommunications services 
provided by mobile wireless carriers; therefore, the terms will be used synonymously in 
this paper.  The terms carrier, operator and service provider are also used synonymously 
in this paper to describe a company that provides mobile wireless services to customers.   
2.2 Market Value 
 
The Canadian wireless services market has performed strongly over the last five 
years, reaching approximately $14.1 billion in revenues in 2007 and boasting a 
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compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 15.9% from 2003-2007 (Datamonitor, 2008).  
Wireless industry revenues for 2008 are estimated to have grown by 11%, which would 
bring 2008 revenues to approximately $15.65 billion (Telus, 2008).  
Figure 1 Industry Revenue 
Source: Datamonitor, 2007 and 2008 
 
Total market value is predicted to climb to $21.1 billion by 2012, an increase of 
50.2% since 2007 (Datamonitor, 2008).  This suggests the CAGR will slow 8.5% 
between 2007-2012 compared to 15.9% over the previous five years (Datamonitor, 
2008).  This growth rate reflects the increasing maturity of the marketplace, which means 
that fewer new subscribers can be counted on to increase revenues.  However, demand 
for the provision of data services, driven in part by the availability of smartphones, is 
expected to serve as a growing source of new revenues. 
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2.2.1 Revenue Streams 
  
 Industry operating revenues can be broken down into two categories: network 
services and product sales (primarily handsets).  Network service revenues are primarily 
derived from the sale of voice minutes, the most basic service that must be purchased to 
talk on a phone.  A second component of network service revenue comes from the sale of 
data, which provides the subscriber with the capability to do things such as browse the 
web from their handset, check email and download music.  Also included in network 
service revenues are services such as voice-mail and caller identification.  Products sold 
by wireless providers include handsets such as cellular phones and smartphones, as well 
as related accessories.  Based on 2008 results from the top three operators, Rogers, Telus 
and Bell, on average, product sales accounted for 7.3% of total wireless revenues (2008).   
A key driver of wireless growth is the increasing adoption and usage of data 
services such as mobile computing, digital picture and video transmission, and text 
messaging.  In 2008, revenue from data services increased by 45% across the industry 
(Bell Canada Enterprises, 2008).  According to Forrester Research, the industry is 
moving away from the early adopter phase for data usage (as cited in Harris, 2009).  This 
is positive news for the industry, as it suggests that data use will accelerate as it is 
increasingly adopted by average customers, not just tech savvy subscribers or business 
people who were willing to try data services and perhaps pay a premium when data 
services were less popular or well-understood. Much of this growth is related to the rapid 
adoption of smartphone devices.  During 2008, the penetration of smartphones in Canada 
doubled from 12% to 21%, a movement that is consistent with the global trend (TNS, 
2009).    Subscribers with data plans, in addition to their basic voice services, typically 
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have much higher average revenues per user (ARPU).  A large source of wireless growth 
will come from the ability of companies to encourage increasing numbers of existing 
subscribers to add data services to their monthly plans.  
2.2.2 Revenue collection (pre-paid vs. post-paid) 
 
Network services are sold to customers by either the pre-paid or post-paid 
method.  Pre-paid means that customers pay for the services they will use in advance.  
Typically the customer can purchase a certain value of services, such as $10, $20, or $30 
that is valid for a specified period of time, often one month.   Pre-paid services are a cost-
effective option for consumers who make minimal use of cellular phones or want to avoid 
a long-term contract.  However, users must purchase their own handset, typically at rates 
higher than those offered to customers who are willing to sign a post-paid contract for 
multiple years.  
Figure 2 Post-Paid vs. Pre-Paid Services 
Post-Paid vs. Pre-Paid Services Sold by Industry Leaders in 2008 
 
   Post-paid  Pre-paid 
Source: Rogers, 2008, Telus, 2008, and BCE, 2008 
Post-paid services are predominant in this industry, as illustrated by figure 2 
above.  Post-paid service plans often require customers to sign a contract ranging from 
one to three years. Customers pay a monthly bill and may be able to bundle their cell 
Rogers Telus Bell 
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phone plan with other services offered by the company, such as cable or internet.  Post-
paid contracts are typically worth more value per unit than pre-paid services.  Post-paid 
contracts are the mainstay for customers that use their phones regularly, as the rates on 
pre-paid services would otherwise be unaffordable. 
2.3 Market Volume (Subscribers) 
 
The industry is experiencing healthy growth in annual subscriber rates (see figure 
3 below).  Since 2000, subscriber numbers have grown at an average annual rate of 
13.62%.  In 2008, approximately 21.5 million Canadians (out of a total population of 
approximately 33 million) subscribed to a wireless service (Canadian Wireless 
Telecommunications Association, 2009 and Statistics Canada, 2009).  While the annual 
growth rate of subscribers has been slowly declining year over year (as shown in figure 3 
below), the market still holds medium potential for subscriber growth.  
Figure 3 Subscriber Growth 
Source: Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association, 2009 
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To understand the significance of subscriber growth rates, the penetration rate 
should also be considered. The penetration rate reflects the percent of Canadians aged 16 
to 60 that own a cell phone.  Canada’s 2009 penetration rate is 70%, up one percentage 
point from the previous year (Shaw, 2009).  This penetration level is below the global 
average of 86% and well below the rate of other developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom, which has a 97% penetration rate and the United States at 91% (Shaw, 2009).  
These statistics suggest that Canadian companies still have an excellent opportunity to 
grow their subscriber and revenue bases through new customer acquisitions, as opposed 
to trying to generate greater revenue out of existing customers.  However, reaching out to 
these consumers may be a challenge, as a recent TNS 2009 Global Telecoms Insight 
study suggests that 22% of Canadians are “rejecters” who do not plan to begin using a 
cell phone in the next 12 months (Shaw, 2009). While the comparison of penetration rates 
is useful, the statistics must be interpreted with some caution.  Differing circumstances in 
other countries may be reflected in their higher penetration levels.  For example, in many 
European countries where GSM technology is used, customers are known to have 
multiple subscriptions with different carriers to avoid high roaming charges.  Thus, it is 
difficult to make an exact prediction of Canada’s growth potential based on comparisons.   
Yet despite these qualifications, international comparisons are still the best type of proxy 
for estimating what percentage of the remaining 30% of Canadians between 16-60 may 
become cell phone adopters.     
Datamonitor, an independent market analysis company predicts subscriber growth 
to increase at a CAGR of 7.6% between 2007-2012 (2008).  At a less optimistic growth 
rate of five percent per year, the industry would still be adding over a million subscribers 
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each year.  However, at a five percent growth rate beginning in 2007, the subscriber base 
can only expand for about another 7 years before reaching saturation.  This calculation is 
based on today’s figures, meaning it assumes the population does not increase, users over 
60 do not use cell phones, and subscribers do not use separate accounts for business and 
personal use.  At the same time, this conjecture optimistically assumes that companies 
will be able to reach maximum penetration by adding users from demographic groups 
that are the least apt to use cellular phones.  However, even with some flexibility in these 
assumptions, to permit for population growth, these figures suggest that the next five 
years will likely be crucial for companies to secure new subscribers before saturation 
begins to be talked about in the industry.   
2.4 Government Regulation 
 
The wireless industry is regulated by the Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission and Industry Canada.   While the pricing of wireless 
services is not regulated, the government monitor’s competition in the industry and 
controls spectrum, a key resource that must be obtained for a provider to offer mobile 
wireless products.  Spectrum licenses are auctioned to carriers at periodic intervals.   
During the 2008 spectrum auction, the government reserved 40% of available 
spectrum for new entrants.  The government essentially removed a barrier to entry by 
protecting the new entrants from having to compete against incumbents who could 
potentially employ a strategy of using their financial resources to outbid new players in 
the auctions in order to keep them out of the industry   The spectrum set-aside also 
ensured enough spectrum was available to allow for a new national carrier or several 
regional players to enter the industry.  Industry Minister Jim Prentice announced that 
   10 
these rules were designed to increase competition in an industry where prices are too high 
for consumers (Ottawa opens up wireless industry to more competition, 2007).  The 
government also mandated roaming agreements, which force existing carriers to share 
their networks with newcomers for five to ten years, as the entrants build up their own 
networks.  The rationale is that building a network is expensive and takes time, so sharing 
agreements will assist new players as they are establishing their networks.  Additionally, 
existing carriers are required to rent space on their towers to newcomers at “reasonable” 
rates or face arbitration (Ottawa, 2007).  The entry of new players in the industry has the 
potential to accelerate growth if the new competitors are able to shake up the industry and 
offer lower prices to engage new consumers.  This in turn would force incumbents to also 
become more competitive with their pricing.  On the other hand, the government’s 
involvement may have a limited effect, if the market cannot support a fourth national 
carrier.   
2.5 Customer Segments 
 
Since the basic products -- voice minutes and data services -- are fairly standard, 
competitors try to differentiate themselves by carrying different handsets and offering 
plans that target different lifestyles or patterns of phone usage.  Customers are commonly 
segmented in two ways. One segmentation breaks out youth, families, and business. A 
separate segmentation distinguishes between discount buyers and premium buyers. 
Youth: 
The youth market is increasingly seen by the industry as a key source for new 
growth.  Several wireless brands are specifically targeted at the youth market.  Research 
by Harris/Decima suggests that tech savvy youth use a higher proportion of data services 
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and are considered among the earlier adopters of new wireless features such as listening 
to and downloading music on a handset (2008).   Harris/Decima’s 2008 study collected 
data on mobile penetration rates by age group (see figure 4 below).  The 30% penetration 
rate in the 13-15 year old bracket along with the 65% rate for 16 to 17 year olds suggests 
that cell phones are not out of the reach of high school students, who likely rely on their 
parents to make purchases.  Furthermore, given that penetration rates in the youth 
brackets rival and exceed those in the 35-55+ range, it is easy to see why carriers 
continue to target this segment where they are having success. 
Figure 4 Cell phone penetration by age group 
 
Source: Harris/Decima, 2008 
Note: This survey excluded cell-only individuals who would increase  
           penetration levels, particularly in the 18-34 age group. 
 
Families: 
Family plans are an important aspect of most operators’ marketing.  Families may 
include parents or couples.  Advertisers reach families with promotions that have 
provisions for shared minutes and data services.  For operators, family plans are 
40% 
66% 
73% 
65% 
30% 
5% 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
55+ 
35 to 54 
18 to 34 
16 to 17 
13 to 15 
8 to 12 
Percentage of cell phone users 
A
ge
 G
ro
up
s 
Canadian Cell phone penetration  
by age group, 2008 
   12 
essentially group contracts that increase the barrier for one of the individuals to switch to 
an alternate provider. 
Business: 
Approximately 27% of Canadians use their cellular phones primarily for business 
purposes, while 8% of Canadians split their use evenly between business and personal 
(Harris/Decima, 2008).  Business customers are often white-collar professionals who 
make heavy use of data services, particularly to access wireless email.    
However, cell phones that act like two-way radios and facilitate group calls have 
been developed for industries such as construction and oil and gas.  These cell phones are 
extremely durable as they are military tested to resist the elements such as rain and dust.  
Furthermore, using these handsets like walkie-talkies is said to increase efficiency on job 
sites as calls can be made more quickly, recipients avoid the temptation to let calls ring or 
go to voice mail and call length is typically shorter.  Furthermore, these phones are 
capable of working within a 3km radius even when worksites are remote and phones are 
outside of network coverage areas.   
Discount Segment: 
Many service plans target customers who are primarily interested in simple 
phones for talk and text services only (Warren, 2008).  Telus’s research indicates that 
while 20-25% of customers are interested in the newest data services like music 
downloads, about 75% are satisfied with basic talk and text plans (Lloyd, 2008). Often 
these types of plans are sold by one of the independently recognized brands of the three 
major carriers, for example, Bell’s Solo brand.   Discount segment subscribers tend to be 
low usage users, first time subscribers and younger subscribers.  
   13 
Premium segment: 
The premium segment consists of customers who gravitate toward higher-end 
devices such as smartphones (typically ranging from $200-$600).  These subscribers are 
usually postpaid customers with higher than average cost monthly plans incorporate a 
variety of services beyond voice and text.  According to Telus’s research, this segment 
accounts for about 20-25% of wireless consumers (Lloyd, 2008). 
2.6 Major Competitors 
 
The major competitors in the wireless industry are facilities based national 
providers.   These companies own and operate the infrastructure and networking 
equipment necessary to provide mobile wireless connections to customers.  Included in 
this group are Telus Corporation, the wireline telecommunications operator in Western 
Canada, Rogers Wireless Incorporated, and BCE, which operates under the Bell brand 
and is Canada’s largest telecommunications company.   
Also in the market are facilities-based provincial telecommunications providers 
Sasktel and MTS Mobility.   Sasktel competes in Saskatchewan and MTS Mobility in 
Manitoba.  
Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) do not own their own wireless 
infrastructure or bandwidth and are therefore required to lease network service from 
facilities based operators.  Among Canada’s MVNOs are Virgin Mobile Canada, Primus 
Telecommunications Canada and President’s Choice.  In May 2009, BCE acquired the 
50% stake in Virgin Mobile, which it did not already own. 
   14 
  The three main incumbents, Rogers, Telus and Bell, hold 95% of the Canadian 
market as of quarter 1, 2009 (Rogers Communications Inc., 2009).  Market share is 
illustrated in figure 5 below:  
Figure 5 Market Share 
 
Source:   http://tiny.cc/JCdjJ 
2.7 Technology Platforms 
 
Each wireless operator in Canada uses one of the two main globally competitive 
network technologies that transmit voice and data: Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) or Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA).  GSM is the 
dominant technology in Europe and is more popular globally; however, CDMA networks 
are very popular in North America and parts of Asia.  GSM networks are estimated to 
hold 73% global market share versus 14% for CDMA (Which technology is better: GSM 
or CDMA?, 2008).  Operators generally have to commit to only one technology because 
each technology standard entails specialized investments in network infrastructure, 
supplier relationships , and  engineering expertise.  Furthermore, handsets are specialized 
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depending on the technology and except in rare cases they cannot roam on incompatible 
networks.   
Historically North American network platform standards were not mandated, 
which meant that companies had to make a strategic investment in their chosen 
technology, without knowing for certain how each technology’s path would evolve, 
which would be superior and if a global standard would emerge.  There have been camps 
on both sides of this standards battle, advocating the technological superiority of each 
standard along criteria such as download speeds and efficiency of spectrum use.  One 
major advantage for GSM operators and their subscribers has been the roaming 
capabilities that are available for GSM users, due to the widespread use of this 
technology globally.  Providers have established roaming contracts with one another. 
This means that when a subscriber travels outside their operators’ coverage area they can 
tap into another operator’s GSM network.  Furthermore, when traveling internationally, 
GSM users can replace their phone’s Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card (essentially 
a removable chip that links the phone to the network) with one purchased from a local 
provider and access the local mobile phone service, thus avoiding international roaming 
charges.  CDMA phones do not work on the SIM card system.   
Each technology platform has an evolution path.  These are essentially technology 
upgrades that have or will be made by providers to allow their networks to deliver faster 
speeds and better quality. These high speeds are increasingly demanded as more and 
more subscribers use data devices to surf the web and download ever-larger files such as 
music.  The next technologies in the evolution path are still in development.  A key 
strategic decision for companies involves determining when to invest in these upgrades 
   16 
and what technologies to choose.  Timing can often be an important factor in these 
decisions which involve taking into consideration what the competition is offering or 
what they will be able to offer in the near future, what is needed to support subscribers’ 
anticipated usage patterns and whether a return on investment can be made in a 
reasonable period of time (based on estimates of future use patterns and the cost of 
upgrades).   
Currently, operators in Canada are using 3G wireless standards, or third 
generation technology (which operators use which standard is discussed later, in section 
4.4).  First generation technology began in the early 1980s and is analog service (now 
decommissioned in Canada).  Second generation technology is digital and emerged in the 
1990s, primarily under the two standards discussed earlier.  3G refers to higher 
bandwidth packet switched networks.  3G delivers voice and data (including multimedia 
applications) at better speeds with higher spectral efficiency.  3G technology for CDMA 
networks is known as EVDO (Evolution Data Optimized).   The GSM equivalent is 
called EDGE (Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution).  The GSM standard’s’s 4G 
technology (not yet commercially available) is known as Long Term Evolution (LTE).  
LTE is emerging as the global standard, as the development of CDMA’s 4G technology 
equivalent has recently been cancelled.  Thus, by the time that 4G technologies are 
commercially available, it is anticipated that there will be convergence to one standard.   
Given their experience with the GSM family of technologies, current GSM operators, 
may have an advantage over CDMA carriers planning to completely overhaul their 3G 
networks with LTE technology. However, this advantage may be minimized by those 
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players that incrementally upgrade their networks, such as Bell and Telus (see section 4.4 
for more details). 
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3.  Porter’s Five Forces 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Canadian mobile wireless services industry is perhaps the most profitable in 
the world.  Merrill Lynch ranks the Canadian industry number one in profitability among 
developed nations (Nowak, Rogers, Bell, Telus: The most profitable cell phones around, 
2008).  The top three carriers had a average profit margin (calculated as revenue divided 
by EBITDA) of 45.9%, well above the developed world's average of 33.1%.  In 
comparison, the mean margin in the US was 32.1%, while the second closest country was 
Italy at 41% (Nowak, Rogers, Bell, Telus: The most profitable cell phones around, 2008).  
In terms of ARPU, a key measure of industry performance, Canadian companies ranked 
second highest in the world out of 53 countries.  Rogers, Telus and Bell’s mean ARPU 
was $60.83 US, compared to the developed nations’ average of $44.24 US (Nowak, 
Rogers, Bell, Telus: The most profitable cell phones around, 2008).  This section will 
apply Porter’s Five Forces model to explore the reasons behind Canada’s lucrative 
industry.  
3.2 Rivalry  
 
Rivalry in the wireless sector is moderate. The three national carriers have 
captured 95% of the market each taking between 28 -38%.  This high concentration 
makes the industry less competitive and is reflected by the industry’s high profit margins.  
Furthermore, given the strong level of market growth, at a CAGR of 15.9% between 
2003-2007, firms are growing simply by expanding the market, rather than fighting to 
take each other’s market share (Datamonitor, 2008).    
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One overarching factor that increases rivalry is the undifferentiated nature of 
airtime and basic services like caller identification and voice mail.   Data services can be 
partially differentiated by download speeds, although speed can depend on factors such 
as the handset, topography and environmental conditions and network congestion 
(Rogers Communications Inc, Rogers Network Advantages, 2009). A survey of the three 
main carriers’ websites shows they charge closely comparable rates for data; however, 
Rogers’ ability to advertise higher speeds may help the company attract subscribers to the 
network.   Thus, as a result of the lack of differentiation with many of the carriers 
services, especially voice services, the industry’s rivals spend large amounts of money to 
differentiate themselves through advertising and branding.    
Given that once a company acquires a post-paid customer, they will likely lock 
them into a one to three year contract, competition for new acquisitions is strong as 
competitors are forced to offer closely matched promotions and make large marketing 
expenditures.   
While the market still holds growth potential, rivalry is likely to increase for 
several reasons.  First, as the penetration rate increases, the number of first-time users 
gets ever smaller (and ever more resistant to using mobile phones).  Second, Industry 
Canada, hoping to increase industry competition, facilitated the entry of several new 
entrants during the 2008 spectrum auctions, as discussed previously in section 2.4.   
These factors have led to increased spending on customer retention (BCE, 2008, Telus, 
2007 and 2008, Rogers Communications Inc, 2008).  This reflects recognition of the need 
to establish long-term customer relationships at the present time in order to ensure that 
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subscribers remain loyal in the future when new entrants arrive or when penetration rates 
reach higher levels.   
3.3 Threat of Entry 
 
               The threat of entry in the industry is moderate.  The high level of capital 
expenditure required to deploy network infrastructure combined with the industry’s 
restrictions on foreign ownership create a strong financial barrier to entry.  Furthermore, 
the government’s regulation of spectrum restricts the opportunity for new entrants to 
compete in the market, as they must first acquire spectrum through a competitive auction 
process that may only occur once every few years.  However, as previously mentioned, in 
2008 the government made provisions that lowered barriers to entry in the industry.  As a 
result, the overall threat of entry in the industry increased from low to moderate. The next 
paragraphs will elaborate on each of these barriers in more detail. 
Given the high level of capital expenditure required to build a facility based 
wireless network, one major barrier to entry in this industry is finance.  In order to 
compete, an extensive network must be built, but risks include a long payback period and 
technological obsolescence due to the fact that incumbents are continually investing in 
the latest technologies.  Mobile Virtual Network Operators may somewhat avert this 
obstacle, but they are then dependent on incumbents that control existing facilities and 
spectrum.  Furthermore, incumbents benefit from a sunk cost advantage given that their 
networks are basically already built and the investment is being recouped through the 
revenues from their established subscriber base.    This means that incumbent’s marginal 
cost for adding a new customer may be lower than for a new entrant  
   21 
Compounding the financial barrier to entry are the industry’s foreign ownership 
restrictions. The Telecommunications Act requires at least 80% of voting shares of 
telecommunications carriers to be held by Canadians (Meckbach, 2009). However, these 
restrictions are currently under government review. 
Third, in order to enter the industry, companies must gain access to spectrum 
through a process controlled by the government.  Spectrum licenses cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars, which adds to the financial burden firms must assume before 
receiving any revenues from subscribers.   During the last spectrum auctions, the 
government introduced a number of regulatory actions that essentially lowered the 
barriers to entry for new companies (refer to section 2.4 for details).   
Overall the threat of entry is moderate.  While there are significant barriers to 
entry, the recent actions of the government were deliberately designed to lower these 
barriers and encourage the entry of new players.  
3.4 Power of Suppliers 
 
The power of suppliers is moderate to strong.  The industry’s major suppliers 
include network equipment providers, handset manufacturers, the government, and 
professional employees.    
There are relatively few network equipment manufacturers in the industry, which 
is dominated by large players such as Ericsson, Samsung and Nokia Siemens.  Due to the 
low level of competitive pressure in the suppliers’ industry, these companies have the 
ability to negotiate strongly with Canadian wireless carriers.   
Handset manufactures also hold a position of power over Canadian operators.  In 
general, operators face a cost premium when trying to purchase handsets.  This is due in 
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part to their relatively small size compared to operators in the United States (Kazam 
Technologies Inc., 2007).   As a result, Canadian companies either acquire handsets that 
are mass-produced for larger operators or pay more to purchase phones. This cost is 
reflected by Canada’s high cost of acquisition (COA), which includes handset subsidies 
that are offered to lure new customers.  Canada’s COA is the second highest in the world 
(Kazam Technologies Inc., 2007).   Ultimately, since handset manufacturers produce for 
carriers around the world, operators in the Canadian market are seen as relatively small 
clients. 
Since carriers rely on manufacturers to provide the latest handsets that will attract 
customers, they often find themselves in a weak negotiating position with manufacturers.  
In particular, the most powerful handset makers such as Apple are able to make costly 
demands of the carriers that sell their devices.  In order to sell the coveted iPhone, 
carriers are obligated to offer subsidies to consumers.  This typically means that carriers 
must incur costs of about $400 on each phone (Sorensen, 2009).  Additionally, handset 
manufacturers can put carriers in a difficult position when they introduce device 
upgrades.  To continue with the Apple example, now that the iPhone 3Gs has been 
introduced, carriers must decide if they will allow subscribers (typically on a three year 
contract) to upgrade without paying the full price of the new phone.  The alternative is to 
insist the subscriber stay with the original device until their contract expires, likely 
upsetting the subscriber (Sorensen, 2009).  Carriers often use such popular devices as key 
aspects of their marketing campaigns.  Thus, despite the fact that most manufacturers rely 
primarily on carriers to sell their handsets, they are still able to yield a considerable 
amount of power. 
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As previously described, the government also has considerable power due to its 
ability to allocate spectrum, a necessary and vital resource.  This affects incumbents as 
industry dynamics and competition are partially controlled by the government and market 
forces are not left to operate on their own.  
Lastly, highly educated managers and engineers are key resources, due to their 
knowledge of the industry and the latest technological innovations.  Companies must 
compete to retain these individuals and pay them competitive salaries.  
3.5 Power of Buyers 
 
In Canada’s mobile wireless industry, the overall the power of buyers is low.  The 
industry has established a barrier to switching by signing the majority of customers to 
long-term contracts with incentives for continued renewal.   Additionally, with only three 
main competitors in the marketplace, price matching amongst competitors is relatively 
consistent, reducing the incentive for customers to switch.   Furthermore, individual 
customers providing $50 to $60 dollars in revenue a month do not have high negotiating 
power in a marketplace where subscriber growth potential remains healthy.    
Customers may have incentive to switch if they do not have a contract and are 
unhappy with customer service or are lured by a special promotion.  One barrier to 
switching was weakened in 2007 when wireless number portability was introduced, 
allowing customers to maintain their number when changing providers.   Nonetheless, 
buyer power is relatively low as the market is expanding each year and the three leading 
players are able to maintain prices that provide them with healthy margins. 
3.6 Threat of Substitutes 
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Substitutes for wireless phones include WiFi, voice over internet protocol (VoIP), 
World Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) and traditional wireline phones.  
The strength of these substitutes will depend on the progress of technological innovation, 
which means the current degree of threat is moderate.  Furthermore, wireless operators 
may have the opportunity to utilize some of these new technologies themselves in the 
future, thereby making them more of an opportunity than a threat. 
WiFi is the technology used to support wireless local area network (WLAN) 
deployments.  Anyone with an Internet connection can set up WiFi networks, since they 
operate on unlicensed spectrum.  WiFi provides  Internet connectivity for compatible 
devices, including laptops and smartphones, that are within a limited area surrounding the 
technology.  For example, WiFi hotspots are often found in coffee houses or airport 
lounges. When several WiFi networks are linked together to form a single network, this is 
referred to as a Mesh network.   Some municipalities and towns are planning to create 
Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN), which are mesh networks spanning an entire city or 
downtown core.  In a few cases, such networks have already been deployed such as in 
Fredericton, New Brunswick where the city has created the Fred-e-zone.  The global 
market for Mesh Networks is expected to grow at a CAGR of 96% to $970 million in 
2009 (Kazam Technologies Inc., 2007).  
With the widespread build out of mesh networks, wireless operators may end up 
competing with municipalities or others who could offer wireless services in metropolitan 
areas.  For example, a company called Cogeco has just introduced a plan that gives 
iPhone users unlimited access to WiFi (download speeds of 8mbps) in Toronto’s 
downtown core (6 km square) for only $5 per month (Kavur, 2009). There is the potential 
   25 
for smartphone users to obtain data services from WiFi operators and make calls over the 
internet using a VoIP  service.  However, with respect to VoIP, specialized Quality of 
Service measures still need to be in place and certain privacy issues need to be resolved 
before voice over wireless local area network can truly become an effective alternative 
means for voice communication (Kazam Technologies Inc., 2007).  Quality of Service 
issues are related to guaranteeing that connections will not be delayed or dropped due to 
interference from other lower priority traffic on a network (VOIP-info.org, 2008).  There 
are already cell phones on the market that are capable of running off an operator’s 
network (your standard mobile service) and switching to WiFi hotspots or mesh networks 
when available (this saves the user money because they can often access the internet for 
free or at lower rates than when using their provider’s mobile network)—although these 
phones are still costly.   
 If VoIP enabled phones were to become more popular, they could pose a threat to 
operators voice revenues, especially if customers started routing calls over home and 
office WiFI connections that are already up and running for other purposes.  Some 
international providers have responded to this threat by banning VoIP services from their 
networks.  VoIP presents a strong challenge for incumbents who are not used to 
competing with VoIP companies such as Skype, that offer free Skype to Skype calls.   
At present, WiMAX is an early stage fixed wireless technology, enabling 
broadband connectivity to residential and business users.  However, the evolution to the 
next standard (820.16e) would allow for communication with mobile devices (Kazam 
Technologies, 2007).  WiMAX technology still needs to achieve reductions in certain 
costs to become more viable (Kazam Technologies, 2007). However, there is the 
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potential threat for new service providers to emerge offering a mobile version of 
WiMAX. In 2005, Rogers and Bell formed a joint venture to construct a pan-Canadian 
broadband network based on evolving WiMAX technology.  Thus, they may be in an 
opportunistic position if WiMAX technology develops favourably in terms of the 
delivery of mobile services.  
 Wireline phones are not considered a large threat since they are not mobile and 
users are increasingly choosing to abandon landlines altogether.   According to a 2008 
Harris/Decima Study, 19% of households are likely to replace one or all of their 
traditional telephone lines with one or more wireless services within the next year (2008). 
Overall, wireless providers may find ways to turn the threat of these substitutes 
into a competitive advantage by integrating them into their business model.  However, 
this often requires high levels of capital expenditure.  At the same time, one of the key 
threats associated with these technologies is that they may provide a way for new 
companies that are not currently competing with cell phone operators to enter the market 
as experts offering these new services.   
3.7 Industry Structure Conclusion 
  
 Analysis using Porter’s Five Forces framework highlights that the relatively 
modest level of rivalry, along with the weak power of buyers are key factors contributing 
to the profitability of the Canadian mobile wireless services industry.  This high 
profitability is maintained in part because the barriers to entry in the industry are 
ordinarily quite high, making it difficult to increase competition amongst facility based 
providers.   
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There are two sources of potential threats to industry profitability for current 
service providers.  First, the government, in its regulatory role, has recently facilitated the 
entry of new players into the industry.  These new firms are expected increase rivalry in 
the market by forcing existing carriers to sacrifice some of their profitability in order to 
compete on price with new entrants or offer incentives to retain customers.  Incumbent 
firms would not ordinarily wish to assist competitors in entering the market by providing 
roaming services and sharing equipment, unless a favourable agreement could be 
reached. However, if incumbents cannot reach tower sharing and roaming agreements 
with new entrants, they face government arbitration. This is a worry for incumbents, as 
there is uncertainty with respect to arbitration rulings and their potential to result in 
unfavourable decisions for incumbent carriers.   
The second threat to profitability comes from new technologies that could 
substitute for some, or all mobile service functions.  The substitutes mentioned in this 
analysis are only those currently well-known, but there is a potential for a disruptive 
technology to threaten current investments in network infrastructure.  In the future 
providers may try to incorporate emerging technologies that could be a threat or develop 
partnerships with alternate service providers.   
Despite the industry’s current level of profitability, no carrier has a geographic 
monopoly that allows it to easily maintain and grow its subscriber base.  The carriers 
must still compete in order to ensure their bottom lines and protect their market share.  
The following section will examine the nature of competition among the three main 
incumbents and examine their potential to remain profitable as the industry changes over 
the next few years. 
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4.  Competition  
This section of the paper evaluates Bell, Telus and Rogers to determine their 
competitive positions in the industry.   The comparison is limited to these companies 
because they drive the industry with a combined market share of 95%.   The intent of the 
comparison is to yield conclusions about which company is best positioned for future 
growth.  In order to identify competitors’ strengths and weaknesses, the analysis will 
employ a series of commonly used industry performance metrics.  Analysts often use 
these metrics when assessing investment opportunities in telecoms (McClure, 2009).   
These measures include average revenue per user  (ARPU), net subscriber additions, cost 
of acquisition per gross subscriber addition (COA), churn per month, and operating profit 
as a percent of total revenue (see Appendix A for complete data).  To round out the 
analysis marketing strategies and network platform choices will also be considered. 
4.1 Leading companies - overview 
 
 This section will provide a brief overview of the industry’s three leading 
companies, covering major developments in the last few years.  BCE is Canada’s largest 
telecommunications company, followed by Telus, which had its roots as Western 
Canada’s wireline provider.  Rogers the leader in terms of wireless market share is 
involved in both the communications and media businesses.  The following chart 
provides an overview of the business units within each corporation, highlighting the fact 
that the companies compete in more than one category.  Of all three providers, BCE 
derives the lowest percentage of revenues from wireless, while Rogers and Telus draw 
around half their revenues from their wireless business. 
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Figure 6 Business division and core products and services for leading companies 
 
 
                                                             
                   
                                                               
                                                                     
 
 
Source: Rogers, 2008, BCE, 2008, Telus, 2008  
 In order to provide a financial snapshot of these companies, revenues, net income 
and profit margin for 2008 have been graphed below (see figure 7).  Bell is clearly the 
revenue leader in the group.  The company’s overall performance in the telecom industry 
may be seen as an indication of the company’s strength (Datamonitor, BCE Inc., 2008).  
In 2007, the Canadian telecom industry generated estimated revenues of $40 billion, with 
Bell Canada and affiliated companies representing about 45% of this total  (Datamonitor, 
BCE Inc., 2008).  However, the analysis that follows (section 4.2) reveals that Bell’s 
wireless segment lags behind the competition in important categories such as profit 
margin and subscriber growth.  Furthermore, BCE’s overall profit margin for 2008, 
dropped below the 12.8% average achieved over the previous five years (Datamonitor, 
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2008).   
Figure 7 Key financial data for BCE, Telus and Rogers, 2008 
Source: Rogers, 2008, BCE, 2008, Telus, 2008 
 In 2007, BCE entered into a transaction that was to result in the privatization of the 
company in late 2008.  However, the purchaser, a private equity consortium led by the 
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, terminated this transaction in late 2008.  The takeover 
deal collapsed after a year and a half of negotiations when an analysis completed by the 
accounting firm KPMG found that BCE could not meet solvency tests defined by the 
agreement.  BCE is now pursuing litigation in order to receive payment of a $1.2 billion 
break-up fee, which the company believes it is entitled to (BCE, 2008).  BCE has 
emerged from this period with a new strategy to deliver a dramatically better customer 
experience, while attaining a competitive and cost-efficient operating structure (BCE, 
2008).  Under the leadership of its new CEO (appointed in summer 2008), Bell is 
undergoing restructuring and reorganization to achieve its new strategy.  In August 2008, 
Bell launched its new corporate brand with a new logo, tagline and advertising campaign.  
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The new brand is designed to be straight-forward and benefit focused (BCE, 2008).   
 The following table provides a snapshot of each company’s wireless division, 
which will be helpful for understanding the subsequent sections of the paper (see figure 
8).  In terms of their wireless divisions, each company has a strong subscriber base of 
over 6 million.  All of the companies retail their products under at least two different 
brands, which allows each company to focus on more than one market segment.  The 
brands are kept separate in the eyes of consumers, so that often shoppers are unaware that 
the parent company owns the other brands. 
Figure 8 Company Snapshots: Wireless Divisions 
Company Snapshots:  
Wireless  Subscribers and Brands 
Company Subscribers  
(year end 2008) 
Brands 
BCE • 6.5 million • Bell 
• Solo 
• VirginMobile 
Telus • 6.1 million • Telus 
• Koodo 
• Mike 
Rogers • 8 million • Rogers 
• Fido 
                                            Source: BCE, 2008, Telus, 2008, Rogers, 2008 
4.2 Comparative evaluation on key industry metrics 
4.2.1 Blended Average Revenue Per User 
 
A key performance and growth indicator is average revenue per user (ARPU). 
This is calculated by dividing network revenue by the average number of subscriber units 
on the network during a given period of time (in this case, one year) and is expressed as a 
rate per month. The graph below illustrates blended ARPU (figure 9), which means that it 
includes data from both pre-paid and post-paid subscribers’ accounts.   
A higher ARPU suggests that on average, the company’s customers are spending 
more with them than the competition’s subscribers spend with their provider.   Four out 
   32 
of the past five years, Telus has led the industry with an ARPU at $60 and above.  
Analysts have speculated that Telus’s drop in ARPU in 2008 may be attributed to the 
launch of Koodo that year, which offers low-cost plans (no contract) starting at $15 per 
month (Jay, 2008).   However, this drop is not necessarily negative since it may allow 
Telus to further penetrate the market before it becomes saturated and it may help the 
company to lure subscribers from the competition.  These new additions also have the 
potential to become premium subscribers in the long-run.   However, in general the 
industry tends to covet steady revenues from post-paid contracts since they typically have 
a higher value than for pre-paid accounts and also provide a steady stream of revenue that 
can be used for capital expenditure planning to develop the network.   
Rogers has been the most consistent, in terms of increasing ARPU year over year, 
surpassing Telus in 2008.  This performance record is reassuring for Rogers, as this is the 
trend that providers want to see as the number of new customers available decreases and 
companies must look to generate growth by extracting higher revenues from their 
existing customers.   
Bell lags behind the competition in this category. This may in part be attributed to 
Bell’s higher proportion of prepaid subscribers.  Bell has recently shifted its focus to the 
post-paid segment. In 2008, the company’s prepaid net subscriber acquisitions decreased 
by 91%, while net post-paid subscriber additions increased by 61% (Bell, 2008).   
However, Bell’s 2008 post-paid only ARPU still lagged behind Rogers’s by just over $9 
(Bell, 2008 and Rogers, 2008).   
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Figure 9 Blended ARPU Comparison 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Subscriber Growth  
 
Figure 10 Net Subscriber Additions Comparison 
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 Net subscriber growth describes how well a company is doing at retaining 
customers and adding new subscribers. It is calculated by subtracting permanent 
subscriber deactivations (ie. customers that leave the subscriber’s service) over a period 
of time from gross subscriber additions (Forbes, 2001). It provides an indication of 
whether the company is able to offer a fresh mix of products to attract new customers and 
adequate levels of customer service to retain existing ones.  Total industry net subscriber 
additions have fluctuated over the past five years, with a generally declining trend.  While 
Roger’s percentage of the total has been higher than Telus’s since 2005, the companies 
have fluctuated in terms of whether they have increased or decreased their share .  
Roger’s dramatic rise in 2005, may reflect the company’s increased marketing and 
distribution capabilities as a result of completed integration following the acquisition of 
Fido.  Bell’s continuously declining net subscriber additions, irrespective of its lower 
absolute number of subscribers compared to Rogers is likely an indication that the 
company is not able to compete as effectively with Rogers and Telus.  Over the past five 
years, Bell has on average had the lowest  percent of customers leave its service (as 
described more specifically in the section on “Churn” below).  This suggests that the 
company’s weakness lies in its ability to attract new customers.  This may stem from a 
combination of weak marketing initiatives or the inability to offer attractive products and 
competitive rate plans. 
4.2.3 Cost of Acquisition  
 
 The cost of acquisition (COA) per gross subscriber provides an indication of the 
marketing expenditures, commissions and promotional discounts that a company must 
offer in order to attract a new subscriber. COA is calculated by dividing total sales and 
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marketing expenditures (including commission), plus costs related to providing 
equipment (handset subsidies) to new subscribers, by the total number of gross subscriber 
activations given during a period (Rogers, 2008).   Handset subsidies are a major 
component of COA, as it has become the industry norm to lure customers by offering 
discounts on the most attractive new phones.   In exchange for the price break, companies 
are typically able to sign clients onto multiple year contracts.   
Roger’s cost of acquisition has consistently risen over the years.  This may reflect 
the company’s ambitious attitude toward customer growth, which is reflected by its 
industry leadership, in terms of net subscriber additions.   Roger’s sharp rise in costs for 
2008 may be associated with its exclusive launch of the iPhone.  The company provided 
the phone’s at a heavily subsidized rate as a marketing tactic that would take advantage 
of the fact that to use the phone subscribers would need to purchase long-term plans that 
include data services.  Prior to the launch of the iPhone in 2008, President and CEO 
Nadir Mohamed estimated the device would bring the company’s overall blended ARPU 
to approximately $90.  This indicates the expectation that costly acquisitions are an 
investment in higher ARPU subscribers (George-Cosh, 2008).   Mohamed’s belief 
implies that the device will have a huge impact on the company’s bottom line. 
Telus’s COA was in a closely comparable range to Roger’s COA (within $15) 
until 2008, when Telus’s costs dropped significantly.  However, this drop does not appear 
to have negatively affected Telus’s gross subscriber additions (up 15%). The company 
indicates that it is a reflection of increased marketing efficiency and gross subscriber 
loading toward lower variable cost channels (ie. prepaid and low-cost plans with lower 
subsidies) (Telus, 2008).  
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Bell’s COA is higher than both Telus’ and Rogers’, in all years but 2008.  This 
metric provides further evidence of Bell’s weakness; since on average Bell must spend 
more money per new subscribers addition, indicating less efficiency in terms of 
acquisition spend.  Bell’s COA suggests that compared to the competition they are either 
forced to offer higher handset subsidies to each subscriber or spend more on marketing 
per new addition, or a combination of the two.  With respect to marketing costs, this 
could also mean that their spending is less effective than the competition, in that they 
may be spending similar amounts of money upfront, but failing to convert this 
expenditure into new accounts. 
Figure 11 Cost per gross subscriber acquisition 
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Furthermore, companies that are able to sign more customers to contracts and that spend 
more on retention (through incentives such as free handset upgrades) are able to decrease 
churn.  Unfortunately, comparative figures for retention spending are not published.  
Churn is a useful metric to examine when considering how the three incumbents will fair 
when new competitors enter the market and as mobile saturation levels increase.  
Companies that are able to lower their churn rates are under less pressure to grow 
revenues through customer acquisitions.   
 Rogers continued ability to reduce its churn rate over the last five years suggests 
that the company has an effective strategy to increase retention and is in a strong position 
to protect its subscriber base as the market becomes increasingly competitive.  Telus’s 
churn rate has increased in the last two years and is on average the highest of all 
competitors, which may indicate a sign of weakness as the environment grows more 
competitive.  Bell has been able to maintain a consistently low churn rate, which suggests 
that once they acquire subscribers, they are able to do a good job of keeping them 
satisfied.  
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Figure 12 Subscriber Churn Rates 
 
4.2.5 Operating Profit Margin as a Percent of Total Revenue 
 
 Operating profit (specific to the wireless segments of these companies) excludes 
the effects of capital expenditure, interest payments and taxes.  This figure provides a 
convenient way to compare the profitability of companies given they may have different 
capital investment schedules.  Rogers has made the most significant improvements to its 
operating profit margin over the last five years.  However, Telus and Rogers appear to 
have been very close competitors over the past three years, suggesting they are in strong 
financial positions going forward.  Consistent with its performance on other metrics, 
Bell’s operating profit margin for its wireless segment is well below the other two 
competitors.  
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Figure 13 Operating Profit Margin as a Percent of Total Revenue 
Note: information not available for Bell in 2004 
4.3 Marketing Strategies 
 
This section will examine how each company is competing to position itself in the 
market place.  In order to compete, companies seek to introduce new promotions or 
iconic devices to appeal to first time subscribers and to provide an incentive for users to 
switch from the competitor.  However, in most cases, there is a pattern of competitors 
quickly matching each other’s offerings with similar products, services or deals.   
        The major firms have all adopted dual or triple brand approaches in order to 
appeal to different consumer segments.  Competing at the lower end of the market are 
discount brands Fido, Koodo and Solo, owned by Rogers, Telus and Bell respectively.   
These basic branded services compete with Canada’s MVNO’s brands such as Virgin 
Mobile (also owned by Bell) and President’s Choice.   
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Roger’s Fido brand previously targeted urban young professionals, but has 
recently re-vamped its branding following Telus’ launch of Koodo.  Fido’s new 
messaging puts more emphasis on targeting price-conscious first-time buyers (Sorensen, 
2008).   
Telus has described its Koodo brand as targeting Generation Y individuals who 
are fed up with paying for long-term contracts and services they don’t use (Warren, 
2008).  When Telus launched Koodo in 2008, they offered  plans at low rates, which 
were previously unheard of in the industry ($15 dollars a month). They also eliminated 
system access fees and 911 charges that were billed by all operators at the time.  Koodo’s 
advertising campaign, which targeted hidden fees and unclear contracts was seen as an 
marketing coup that may partially account for Telus’s ability to grab almost half of new 
subscribers added by the big three in the second quarter of 2008.  However, the other 
discount brands in the industry quickly followed suit by dropping access fees and 
offering new low priced plans (Jay, 2008). 
Bell has also made changes to strengthen its position in the discount segment.  
The acquisition of Virgin Mobile allows Bell to further segment customers by appealing 
to different aspects of the discount market.  Bell’s Solo brand specifically targets young 
Canadians aged 13-24, while the Virgin Mobile brand, which will remain independent in 
the eyes of the consumer, also appeals to a youth market (18-35) and is known for its 
more provocative and edgy advertising campaigns.  Bells acquisition of Virgin Mobile 
allowed the company to expand its subscribers base at a lower cost of acquisition then it 
would have to pay to acquire these subscriber through its two existing brands (BCE, 
2009).   
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Telus, Rogers and Bell, as brands, are often described as serving the premium 
market, as these brands typically sell the latest smartphones and higher-end service 
contracts.  However, it is important to note that these brands are not exclusively focused 
on the premium segment.  They offer a wide assortment of handsets and plans to suit any 
customer looking for mobile services.  However, Telus, Rogers and Bell generally charge 
system access fees that have been eliminated from their  discount counterparts.  The 
companies say that these charges are used for ongoing maintenance and investment in 
their networks (Nowak, Goodbye to cellphone system access fees?, 2008).  However, 
since the big three are not charging these fees to their discount brand subscribers, they are 
to a certain extent relying on subscriber’s being unaware that those brands are associated 
with the parent company or being ignorant of the issue altogether.    However, Rogers, 
Telus, Bell, MTS Allstream and SaskTel are currently facing a $20 billion class-action 
lawsuit over system access fees.  Regina-based lawyer Tony Merchant claims that for 
years the companies have misrepresented the charges as government-mandated fees 
(Nowak, Goodbye to cellphone system access fees?, 2008).  Merchant also launched a 
similar lawsuit over the carrier’s 911 fees, in the summer of 2008  (Nowak, Goodbye to 
cellphone system access fees?, 2008). 
A survey of the operators’ websites suggests that their post-paid plans and prices 
are almost identical, although they may be branded differently. Operators will typically 
have only one or two limited-time offers that stand out from the competition and give 
them a temporary window of time to try and gain market share by sacrificing price.  
However, such promotions are usually kept to a short duration by the operator or, they 
are matched by the competitor. For example, Rogers has a series of MY5 plans that allow 
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subscribers unlimited talk and text with five friends.  When introduced, Rogers heavily 
advertised this service.  Telus and Bell also offer an identical service but it is not branded 
under a special name.  The rates and terms on these plans are nearly identical.  In other 
cases, plans are offered at the same price point with one minor variation of service (see 
appendix B for an example).  Therefore, while price are comparable, users must 
determine which services are the most value to them.   
One of the primary ways that operators are able to distinguish themselves is 
through the handsets they sell.  These are typically offered at subsidized prices and are a 
key incentive for customers to sign long-term contracts.  In this regard, Rogers has a 
slight advantage in that it has access to a larger array of handsets due to the type of 
network its devices run on (see section 5.4 below).  Among these handsets is the iconic 
Apple iPhone.   
In terms of services for the business segment, Telus has a unique position with its 
Mike branded services that are targeted primarily at businesses in the areas of 
construction, automotive, and oil and gas.   Mike offers Push-to-Talk technology that 
works like a two-way radio and allows for easy group calls.  These handsets run on 
Telus’s enhanced specialized mobile radio network, the only network of this type in 
Canada. 
4.4 Technology Platforms 
 
Rogers operates on a GSM/General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) network, with 
EDGE technology (3G).  By contrast, Telus and Bell operate on CDMA networks with 
the 3G technology EVD0. These two operators have had a network sharing and roaming 
agreement in place since 2001.  Rogers has also recently deployed Universal Mobile 
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Telecommunications System (UMTS)/High Speed Packet Access (HSPA) technology, 
the next phase of the evolution of the GSM/EDGE platform, which delivers high 
mobility, high bandwidth data services across major urban centers (this network covers 
75.6% of Canada’s population).   Rogers HSPA supports download speeds of up to 7.2 
Mbps and is referred to as 3.5G technology.  This is faster that Telus’ and Bell’s network 
(3G) that supports speeds of up to 3.1 Mbps. 
One competitive advantage of Roger’s GSM network platform (the only one in 
Canada) is that it allows the company access to a greater breadth of handsets often at 
lower costs (Telus, 2008).  Different handsets must be designed to utilize either GSM or 
CDMA but not both; although this does not preclude different versions of the same 
device being manufactured for both.  Roger’s better access to handsets is likely a 
reflection of the fact that worldwide GSM networks have 73% market share, verses 14% 
for CDMA (Which technology is better: GSM or CDMA?, 2008).    Therefore, handset 
manufacturers produce more GSM compatible devices and it is possible that they may be 
manufactured in greater quantities and therefore sold at a lower cost. Producing for both 
technologies requires double the development effort and is not always worthwhile for 
highly popular devices that sell well through GSM distributors.  Furthermore, the attitude 
among handset makers such as Apple, is that CDMA is becoming less attractive as 
providers transition away from the technology with their next generation upgrades 
(Mclean, 2009). In 2008, Roger’s became the exclusive distributor of the iconic Apple 
iPhone, as well as Research in Motion Ltd’s popular Blackberry Bold (both are only 
GSM compatible).  Telus believes that Rogers’s introduction of the iPhone at a $199 
price point in mid 2008 negatively affected its wireless margins because it led to 
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discounts for all smartphones in Canada.  These smartphones typically cost between 
$600-$800 ((Telus, 2008). However, Rogers had an incentive to discount the phone with 
the belief that its popularity would attract a significant number of customers who would 
sign contracts with data plans, which yield higher than average revenues. 
As the only Canadian operator of a GSM network, Rogers has also benefited from 
roaming partnerships with other foreign operators.  Thus, Rogers has had access to 
additional roaming revenues without any competition from the other two industry leaders.   
In 2008, Bell and Telus announced an agreement to share the costs of overlaying 
their network with the latest version of HSPA technology by 2010.  HSPA is part of the 
GSM evolution path.   This upgrade was announced as a step toward an eventual 
transition to 4G LTE (GSM), which is emerging as a global standard.   Rogers has 
already implemented HSPA technology to improve the speed of its network.  This 
upgrade will put pressure on Rogers, as it will give Telus and Bell the capability to 
support the same GSM/HSPA handsets as Rogers.  Thus, Telus and Bell could potentially 
sell the iPhone or similar devices that will be developed in the future (Sorensen, 2009).  
The upgrade will also give Telus and Bell access to roaming agreements with foreign 
operators or new carriers.  Rogers, on the other hand, may be able to benefit from its 
years of experience with GSM based technologies, as HSPA and LTE are part of the 
evolutionary path for GSM operators.  Thus Bell and Telus’s plans represent a shift away 
from their CDMA path.   Telus and Bell’s announcement came shortly after the 2008 
auctions. The move may be regarded as strategically timed, since it will allow these two 
incumbents to run on the latest technology (ahead or in line with new entrants).  
Furthermore, new entrants will need to negotiate roaming agreements while they build 
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out their networks.  HSPA networks would be the primary choice for those companies 
offering voice and data service, which means Bell and Telus can compete with Rogers for 
these revenues.  There is speculation that potential roaming revenues may be important in 
lieu of lost market share (George-Cosh, 2008).   
4.5 Preparation for new competition 
 
As a result of the 2008 spectrum auctions, several companies acquired spectrum 
licenses.  To date, four companies have announced plans to launch services. They include 
DAVE Wireless, Public Mobile, Globalive Wireless and Quebecor-Videotron.  Only 
Globalive is planning a national network, while DAVE Wireless will focus on several 
metro areas. 
Incumbent firms have already taken steps to defend themselves against the threat 
of new competition.  Industry Canada has mandated that incumbents share infrastructure 
and negotiate roaming agreements with new entrants to help them support customers and 
minimize costs while they roll-out their own networks.  Iain Grant, managing director of 
SeaBoard Group, a Montreal based telecommunications consultancy suggests that 
incumbents have likely built a defense against the new entrants by making plans to 
expand their networks.  The government’s rules say that incumbents have to share 
antennas if there is unused capacity, but expansion plans, such as Telus and Bell’s 
announcement to overlay their networks with HSPA, may require the carriers to use most 
of their extra capacity to run their new services, forcing new players to rely on their own 
networks (Solomon, 2008).  These improvements to network technology (already 
deployed by Rogers) will also ensure that all three incumbents are able to offer devices 
that run on the latest, fastest technology. This will set the standard for new incumbents, 
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forcing them to build networks to the latest technological specifications in order to offer 
competitive products and services.   
 Another strategic move by the incumbents has been the strengthening of their 
position in the discount market.  Several new entrants have announced that they would 
like to take advantage of consumers’ discontent with current providers and target the low-
end market to reach out to first time cell phone users.  However, the industry has already 
taken strides to address many of these concerns.  The process began in 2008 with the 
introduction of the Koodo brand, which introduced new budget rates and eliminated 
hidden fees (refer to section 4.3 for details). 
 Bell has also taken action to expand its distribution network.  In March 2009 the 
company purchased consumer electronics chain The Source, out of bankruptcy 
protection.   The acquisition of 756 The Source stores doubled Bell’s current number of 
corporate owned or licensed stores to 1,450 compared with Rogers, which has 1,100 
stores and Telus, with about 800 stores (Flavelle and Sorensen, 2009).  The purchase also 
helps Bell to curb its competitor Rogers’s distribution network.  Rogers’s phones are 
currently distributed by The Source, but the contract will expire at the end of 2009, at 
which point the stores will start selling Bell’s products and services (Flavelle & Sorensen, 
2009).     
4.6 Conclusions   
 
           In terms of growth prospects for the future, based on the analysis using key 
industry metrics, Rogers and Telus both appear well positioned to continue as industry 
leaders.  Rogers’ ongoing ability to improve its performance in key areas such as blended 
ARPU and churn rate, suggests that the company is successfully executing a strategy to 
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improve the quality and retention of its customer base.  Rogers also leads the industry in 
terms of yearly net subscriber additions and will enter the forthcoming period of 
increased competition with the largest established subscriber base.  Based on the 
performance metrics, Telus has also demonstrated consistently strong results over the 
years, even as Rogers has improved its abilities in some areas.   Telus has rivaled and 
even outperformed Rogers over the last five years in the key measures of blended ARPU 
and operating profit margin.   Furthermore, while Telus’s total subscriber base is slightly 
smaller than Bell’s, the company appears to have a better track record for acquiring new 
customers and does so at a lower COA than both its competitors.    
 Bell lags behind its competitors in almost all areas, although its total subscriber 
base is slightly larger than Telus’s and the company does have fairly low churn rates.  
Bell’s recent changes may be looked at to provide clues as to why the company has 
trailed behind its competitors.  The acquisitions of Virgin Mobile and The Source both 
address weaknesses in Bell’s distribution network, which may have contributed to the 
company’s underperformance in attracting and retaining subscribers. Furthermore, Bell’s 
decision to overhaul the company’s corporate image and acquire Virgin Mobile, which as 
an MVNO specialized in marketing services, may be taken as a sign that the company felt 
it was in an inferior position to competitors, when it came to orchestrating effective and 
memorable advertising campaigns.  Lastly, Bell’s new corporate strategy is focused on 
improving the cost efficiency of its operations, in part through restructuring.  This may 
help Bell catch up to competitors in terms of generating healthier profit margins.  Bell is 
currently displaying a strong degree of momentum that is anticipated to help improve its 
wireless results and ensure the company is in a strong position to face new competition.  
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Thus, although Bell’s performance on industry metrics is poorer than its competitors, it is 
very difficult to count out the telecommunication industry’s largest player.   
In the last few years, Rogers appears to have gained a slight competitive 
advantage as the only operator in Canada of a GSM network, Rogers has had access to 
highly popular Blackberry and Apple devices that are only compatible with GSM 
technology.  These devices, particularly the iPhone, are seen as drivers of high ARPU.  
Rogers is also ahead of competitors in pioneering new services such as  Fido UNO and 
Rogers Home Calling Zone plans (introduced in 2008) that capitalize on technologies that 
could otherwise become a threat.  These plans encourage subscribers to have just one 
phone in their lives by allowing them to make unlimited calls from their cell phones 
when in their homes by using a home WiFi broadband connection (see section 3.6 for an 
explanation of how WiFi works).  Furthermore, Roger’s network is one step ahead of its 
competitors in terms of technology implementation, which shows its leadership in the 
industry and allows it to advertise the fastest download speeds.  On the other hand, Telus 
and Bell have still been highly competitive with their CDMA technology and have been 
able to share the costs of rolling out their networks.  From a technological perspective, it 
is difficult to predict where the industry will be in five years and which company will be 
best positioned, as standards are always evolving and disruptive technologies may 
threaten business models at any time.   
Given that the market share held by the big three is 95%, there is speculation that 
the new entrants may need to merge in order to make an effective entry in the market.  
With the exception of Globalive’s Yak long-distance brand and a few of the cable 
companies, such as Quebecor (other cablecos purchased spectrum but have not yet 
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announced any market entry plans), the potential new players have limited brand 
recognition.  Furthermore, capital expenditures for network development will be high, 
which means the pressures to quickly build market share will be strong.  This situation 
may be difficult for new companies if several emerging brands are all competing for 
subscribers.  A possible scenario could see new entrants acquired by existing companies, 
as was the case of Microcell’s Fido, a disruptive new entrant that acquired 1.2 million 
subscribers (and a shackling debt load) before being acquired by Rogers in 2005 (Nowak, 
What if Telus bought Fido, 2008).  However, government rules prevent such a sale until 
2013 (Jay, 2009). 
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5. Future Outlook 
5.1 Key challenges 
  
 This section identifies key areas that all the carriers need to focus attention on in 
order to strengthen the industry and ensure its vitality in the future.  It also discusses 
emerging areas of interest, which if considered by carriers now, may ultimately develop 
into important revenue drivers in the future.   
5.1.1 Increasing the mobile penetration rate 
 
 Canada’s mobile penetration rate is estimated at 70%, which suggests that around 
30% of the population is still not using mobile devices.  A higher penetration rate brings 
the promise of higher revenues, even if new subscribers bring in lower ARPUs.  The 
government’s assistance to new entrants may turn out to be a key strategic move toward 
increasing Canada’s penetration rate, provided these new entrants excite competition, 
which leads to lower prices that are taken advantage of by first-time users.  With respect 
to wireless prices it is difficult to determine if Canada’s prices are more expensive then 
those in other countries and therefore, if price is in fact a key driver of penetration rates.  
Country to country price comparisons are complicated due to the way in which minutes, 
data plans and extras such as voicemail and caller identification are bundled into different 
packages.  However, a Canadian Library of Parliament publication released in late 2008 
found that three of four studies available showed Canadians pay more for their wireless 
services (Kustra, 2008).   
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5.1.2 Managing network capacity 
 
The increased uptake of data services is being reported with much fanfare in 
carriers’ annual reports since data plans boost revenue growth.  However, the trend 
toward data adoption also presents a challenge for carriers who need to ensure their 
networks have the capacity to support such services.  Mike Lazaridis, Co-CEO of 
Research in Motion Ltd., explains the situation in laymen’s terms.   
A smartphone customer using a moderate two gigabytes of data a month - about 
the equivalent of downloading three movies - is consuming the same bandwidth 
as one who spends more than 10 hours a day talking with his mobile phone.   Put 
another way, today’s smart phone demands the same amount of capacity on a 
wireless network as 40 regular cell phones (Avery, 2009, B6).  
 
The consumer behaviour described by Lazaridis requires billions of dollars in capital 
expenditure in order to ensure networks are robust enough to handle internet traffic at the 
quality of service expected by customers.     
The relationship between data services and network capacity presents two key 
strategic challenges for firms.  Firstly, firms must make critical decisions about 
technology investments today, before exact information about demand is available.  This 
involves closely monitoring the market to anticipate what services will be adopted and by 
how many subscribers will need to be supported.  Secondly, since companies must spend 
billions of dollars to build robust capacity, they must ensure that they make a timely a 
return on their investment, without resorting to charging customers prices that lead to 
subscriber losses.  In this regard, operators must look at value added services and new 
products that will service subscribers infotainment needs.  This challenge is discussed in 
more detail below.   
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5.1.3 Deploying and Monetizing Value-Added Services 
 
 In their analysis of the Canadian Wireless Industry, prepared for Industry Canada, 
Kazam Technologies Inc., suggested that the Canadian market is lagging comparable 
industries in other developed nations when it comes to looking for innovative ways to 
build revenue outside of voice (Kazam Technologies Inc., 2007). Creating and 
monetizing value added services is key to generating a return on infrastructure 
investments that are made to support subscribers data needs. Examples of these value 
added services include enhanced messaging services and content applications such as 
GPS and mobile TV.  Kazam’s analysis is that Canadian operators currently take a “smart 
follower” approach to technology, by watching mature markets such as Japan and Korea 
to see what is popular and then adopting it 18-24 months later.  To a certain extent, 
Kazam admits this makes business sense, as it allows Canadian companies to minimize 
risk by seeing what works.  It could also reflect a lesser degree of competition in the 
marketplace, which means that Canadian companies do not feel pressure to compete at 
the same level as in these mature markets.  However, the implication is that while 
companies in these mature markets focus on creating demand for new services and 
thereby reap the financial benefits, Canadian operators are more focused on serving a 
demand if it arises.  Thus, they are not as aggressive in marketing value added services, 
creating awareness and reaping the financial benefits.   However, being able to create and 
monetize new content and services will become increasingly important in the future, 
especially as competition intensifies and as greater investments are made in network 
infrastructure. 
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 Mobile content will likely become an increasingly important revenue stream for 
wireless providers if more subscribers become accustomed to seeing both voice and data 
services as a mainstay.  In order to deliver better content to subscribers, operators in 
Canada may need to consider closer partnerships with content developers, according to 
Kazam Technologies:  
 
A more open and dynamic ecosystem for mobile content and applications is 
needed in Canada.  In South Korea, operators and content providers share more 
revenues with content developers and aggregators and invest in innovative content 
development companies. (2007, p. 221) 
 
In essence, South Korea’s mature market reflects a closer integration of the value chain.  
Operators and developers in Korea are also known to partner together to market new 
content    Currently, companies such as Roger and Telus offer their own music stores, 
games and applications such as GPS.   However, serious competition over content has not 
yet emerged in Canada as a differentiating factor, although such competition could be on 
the horizon, if other international markets are an indication of future trends.     
5.1.4 Mobile Commerce  
 
 Mobile Commerce is a catch-all phrase used to describe commercial transactions 
that are enabled through mobile technology (Kazam Technologies Inc., 2007). Rogers, 
Bell and Telus have formed a joint venture with technology company EnStream LP to 
launch a new service called Zoompass that enables consumers to transfer money over 
their phones.  The system is currently focused on the consumer market but could have 
applications for businesses that don’t want to accept credit cards because of the fees 
involved (Ruffolo, 2009).    While mobile commerce is still in the development stages, if 
operators can have a stake in development, they may gain access to new revenue streams 
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that result from changes in the way people purchase goods.   According to a recent study 
by research firm Gartner Inc., worldwide mobile payment users will total 74.4 million in 
2009, a 70% increase over the preceding year.  By 2012, the number is expected to 
surpass 190 million users (Gartner Inc., as cited in Ruffolo, 2009). 
5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 Leveraging Strengths 
 
As new competitors enter the market, the incumbent players may be exposed to 
aggressive marketing campaigns and competitive pricing.  Price competition from new 
carriers will be required for their entry into the market, particularly since existing 
subscribers will see it as a hassle to switch providers and may be giving up some of the 
perks (such as added minutes or free services) that they have received for being loyal 
customers.  One of the best ways to gain market share will be to offer lower rate plans or 
packages with unlimited data and voice.  However, another avenue for competition will 
be based on customer relations and service.  This competition would capitalize on public 
sentiment regarding generally poor customer service, as well as discontent over the 
industry’s “hidden fees,” misleading contracts and long/inflexible contracts.  In order to 
tackle these two areas of vulnerability, carriers will likely need to reevaluate and 
strengthen customer relations strategies and/or increase retention spending.   
Existing carriers should combine such improvements with strategies that leverage 
their current strengths.  Existing sources of advantage include carriers’ large subscriber 
bases, bundling capabilities, network size and dependability, dual and triple brand 
strategies, and financial capabilities.   
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• Subscriber base: The top three providers have over 6 million subscribers each.  It 
is cheaper for the carriers to retain customers than acquire new ones, giving the 
incumbents a huge advantage over newcomers.   If carriers can make gestures to 
address the needs of their existing customers who may be unhappy with their 
current services, then they will protect themselves from having these customers 
poached when new companies enter the market.  It should be the goal of 
incumbent companies to create a marketplace in which new companies only have 
access to the pool of subscribers who currently are not cell phone users.  
Additionally, given the size of their subscriber base, incumbent carriers will be in 
an advantageous position to negotiate with handset manufacturers for exclusive 
distribution agreements for the latest phones. 
 
• Bundling capabilities: All three of the major players benefit from offering a 
variety of telecommunications and entertainment services such as TV and 
internet.   Thus, compared to most new competition, they may offer subscribers 
the convenience of having all their services delivered from one provider, at a 
discounted fee.  Bundling may become an ever more important strategy for 
preventing customers from switching and locking in new subscribers before new 
players arrive on the scene 
 
• Network size and dependability: New subscribers will likely be weary of the 
quality and reliability of new providers’ services.  One of the new entrants 
purchased spectrum in the 1.9 Ghz band, considered less desirable (and less 
costly) because of its lower capacity and potential to be incompatible with 
handsets (Solomon, 2009).  The merits of this spectrum has already been 
discussed in the press, as the company holding the spectrum was publicly targeted 
by another new entrant (Solomon, 2009).  Regardless of spectrum quality, given 
that the incumbents have been operating their networks for years, it would not be 
surprising to see future advertising campaigns emphasizing the dependability and 
quality of the big threes’ networks.   
 
• Dual and triple brand strategies:  With two to three brands in the market, each 
of the major carriers is able to better segment the market to appeal to different 
consumer tastes and demands.  This flexibility will undoubtedly help protect 
incumbents as new players who enter the market must establish their brands in the 
eyes of consumers and will only be able to compete in one or possibly two 
segments.   
 
• Financial capabilities:  As discussed, the financial barriers to entering the 
industry are high.  New players will focus on building their networks while also 
making expenditures to secure subscribers.  On the other hand, existing carriers 
can leverage the fact that they have more financial flexibility to invest in 
exploring new technologies, developing closer collaborative relationships with 
content and applications providers, and piloting new services.  The rate of change 
in the industry means that providers cannot be complacent because their current 
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services are highly profitable and they have contracts that secure their customers 
in the face of new competition.   
 
5.2.3 Flexibility in business models 
 
For all mobile service providers, new and old, the industry faces a future where 
technological innovations could change the traditional nature of operations.  Whether it is 
mobile commerce or wireless mesh networks, new competitive services and technologies 
are likely to threaten the way in which service providers currently operate.  Before or as 
new disruptive technologies reach tipping points, the traditional wireless operators will 
need to consider modifications to their billing models or technology choices in order to 
respond to the competition.  Sticking to traditional rate plans, in light of new low-cost 
WiFi data plans such as Conego’s Toronto area plan, or banning VoIP services from 
phones may be short-term solutions.   After all, at present, such WiFi plans are only 
available in select spots and quality VoIP services are not readily available.  However, 
there is a chance that innovations like these could develop in the future.  Therefore, 
carriers must anticipate when the momentum of the market may switch in another 
direction and accordingly, they must be flexible with how they package their service.  
There may be an opportunity to develop partnerships with “new” service providers like 
Conego, in order to offer value to subscribers and limit the effect of such services on 
revenues. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 At present the industry is an attractive place for mobile wireless providers.  It is 
characterized by high profit margins, a compound annual growth rate of nearly 16% over 
the past five years and continued opportunities to add new subscribers.  The popularity of 
smartphone devices is also fueling market growth by allowing  carriers to earn higher 
revenues by selling more to their existing customers.  The high concentration of players 
seems to work towards protecting the industry’s profitability, as consumers are limited in 
their options.   
The fast pace of development in the industry may be good news for carriers, as it 
suggests that their product’s appeal will continue to evolve, offering new opportunities to 
engage customers and maintain revenues.  At the same time, companies are at risk of 
falling behind the competition if they fail to make the right decisions with respect to new 
technologies or strategies for dealing with competitive mobile offerings.    As society 
becomes more accustomed to entertainment, communications and information on the go, 
the possibilities for mobile phone functionality extend beyond our current imagination.  
Industries such as advertising, banking, gaming and security could all begin to play an 
increasingly significant role in the industry.   
Given the industry’s attractiveness, it is not surprising that new firms are 
interested in breaking into the marketplace, especially with the support of the 
government.   It remains to be seen if new entrants can make an impact in an industry 
where the top three players have become well established and are already taking 
measures to maintain their positions.  Ultimately, it would not be surprising to see new 
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competitors form an alliance in order to challenge the incumbents and carve out market 
share in this lucrative industry.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Key Operating Metrics: 2004-2008 Data 
 
 
Key Operating Metrics: 2004-2008      
Operating Metrics: 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Operating Revenues      
Rogers 2,689,000,000 3,860,000,000 4,580,000,000 5,503,000,000 6,335,000,000 
Telus 2,833,000,000 3,319,000,000 3,881,000,000 4,291,000,000 4,660,000,000 
Bell 2,818,000,000 3,428,000,000 3,849,000,000 4,164,000,000 4,481,000,000 
Operating Network (only) Revenues           
Rogers 2,502,000,000 3,614,000,000 4,313,000,000 5,154,000,000 5,843,000,000 
Telus 2,599,900,000 3,064,600,000 3,605,500,000 4,008,000,000 4,369,000,000 
Bell   3,054,000,000 3,464,000,000 3,773,000,000 4,058,000,000 
Wireless Data Revenue           
Rogers 142,000,000 297,000,000 459,000,000 683,000,000 946,000,000 
Telus n/a 130,600,000 2,799,000,000 445,161,290 690,000,000 
Bell  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Data Revenue as a Percent to Total Revenue            
Rogers 5.7% 8.2% 10.6% 13.2% 15.0% 
Telus n/a 4.3% 7.7% 11.1% 16.0% 
Bell n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Continued on next two pages 
 
Sources:  All data was derived from the annual financial reports of Rogers Communications Inc., BCE Inc., and Telus Corporation 2004-2008 
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  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Operating Profit and Operating Profit as a 
percent of Total Operating Revenues           
Rogers operating profit 950,000,000 1,337,000,000 1,969,000,000 2,532,000,000 2,797,000,000 
Operating profit as percent of total operating 
revenues 35.3% 34.6% 43.0% 46.0% 44.2% 
Telus operating profit (also reported as EBITDA) 114,200,000 1,445,000,000 17,529,000,000 1,906,000,000 2,005,000,000 
operating profit as adjusted       1,930,000,000 2,005,000,000 
operating profit as a percent of total operating 
revenues 40.3% 43.5% 45.1% 44.4% 43.0% 
Bell operating profit not reported sep. 912,000,000 984,000,000 1,198,000,000 1,241,000,000 
operating profit to total  operating revevnue n/a 26.6% 25.6% 28.8% 27.7% 
Total Postpaid Retail Subscribers           
Rogers 5,518,200 6,168,000 6,778,000 7,338,000 7,942,000 
Telus 3,936,400 4,520,700 5,055,900 5,568,000 6,129,000 
Bell (total pre and post) 3,743,000 4,026,340 5,954,023 6,216,000 6,497,000 
Net Subscriber Additions           
Rogers (postpaid) 446,100 603,100 580,000 581,000 537,000 
Rogers (prepaid) 32,500 15,700 30,000 70,000 67,000 
Telus (postpaid) 428,500 426,500 411,800 365,000 481,000 
Telus (prepaid) 83,900 157,800 123,400 150,000 80,000 
Bell (postpaid) 
513000 (pre and 
post) 
516000 pre and 
post 293,000 206,000 332,000 
Bell (prepaid)     127,000 202,000 19,000 
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  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ARPU           
Rogers (postpaid only) 59.50 63.56 67.27 72.21 75.27 
Rogers (prepaid only)- see below for blended 
calculation 11.80 13.20 13.49 16.46 16.65 
Telus blended 60.00 61.51 63.46 63.56 62.73 
Bell blended  49.00 49.00 51.18 53.92 54.29 
Monthly Churn (postpaid)           
Rogers 1.8% 1.6% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 
Telus 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.5% 
Bell 1.1% 1.4% 1.1% 1.3% 1.2% 
COA Per gross subscriber addition           
Rogers 372 388 399 401 459 
Telus 389 386 412 395 346 
Bell 411 405 420 404 395 
 
Rogers Blended ARPU calculation 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Postpaid Voice and data revenue 2,361,100,000 3,384,000,000 4,084,000,000 4,868,000,000 5,548,000,000 
Average number post-paid subscribers 3,306,900 4,435,800 5,059,600 5,618,000 6,142,000 
Prepaid Voice and data revenue 116,700,000 210,000,000 214,000,000 273,000,000 285,000,000 
Average number of prepaid subscribers 818,500 1,323,200 1,322,000 1,382,000 1,426,000 
      
Voice and data revenue 2,477,800,000 3,594,000,000 4,298,000,000 5,141,000,000 5,833,000,000 
divided by average number of 
subscribers 4,125,400 5,759,000 6,381,600 7,000,000 7,568,000 
Divided by 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Rogers Blended ARPU 50.05 52.01 56.12 61.20 64.23 
Source: calculation method and data obtained from Rogers Communications Inc. annual reports, 2004-2008 
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Appendix B: Comparison of $25 rate plans offered by the big three 
 
Carrier to carrier comparison of $25 rate plans 
Rogers Bell Telus 
Mega value $25 with 1000 
Messaging 
 
-100 plus 50 bonus 
weekday minutes 
-unlimited evenings and 
weekends from 9pm 
-1000 messages 
-Rogers.com $10 
activation credit (web 
offer only) 
 
Uber $25 Incoming 
 
-100 local minutes 50 bonus 
minutes. 
-unlimited nights and 
weekends local minutes (9 
p.m. - 7 a.m.) 
-500 incoming minutes  
Mega $25 with My5 local 
 
-same as above, but no 
messages, instead My5 
local 
Uber $25 fab five 
 
-100 local minutes 50 bonus 
minutes 
-Unlimited nights and 
weekends local minutes (9 
p.m. - 7 a.m.) 
-local Fab Five  
 
Anytime $25 
 
-250 minutes 
-unlimited evenings and 
weekends (9p.m.-7a.m.) 
 
Mega Value $25 with 
double your minutes 
 
-200 plus 50 bonus 
weekday minutes 
-unlimited evenings and 
weekends from 9pm 
-Rogers.com $10 
activation credit (web 
offer only) 
Uber $25 extended hours 
 
-100 local minutes 50 bonus 
minutes 
-Unlimited nights and 
weekends local minutes (6 
p.m. - 7 a.m. 
Your Choice $25 Plans 
 
Includes: 
-up to 100 local anytime 
minutes 
-up to 50 bonus anytime 
minutes 
 
Plus your choice: 
 
-unlimited local talk, text, 
picture and video 
messaging with your 
5 favourite numbers 
 
-double anytime minutes 
 
-1000 outgoing and 
unlimited incoming text, 
picture and video messages 
 
Source: Rogers Communications Inc., Telus, and BCE websites 2009
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